BigGuy, you write:
quote:
I know we all love to speculate the DFO's incompetence managing our BC Salmon resources. I believe I've found documented evidence of their incompetency.
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It's worse than incompetence. Think the sponsorship scandal and the Mulrooney/Schribe/Airbus were outliers? The only mistakes they made was in getting caught. See below..
Why has open net-cage salmon aquaculture been promoted?
The Aquaculture “Debate” - How Did We Get Here?
From Maurice Beaudin “Towards Greater Value: Enhancing Eastern Canada’s Seafood Industry” (
http://www.umoncton.ca/icrdr/PROD MER EN.pdf):
“In 1977, when the Canadian government officially established the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the fisheries seemed to enter a period of unprecedented cyclical instability, a situation that led to two Royal Commissions in the space of ten years. In the euphoria following the creation of the EEZ, the five eastern provinces quickly began modernizing and increasing their production capacity to derive maximum benefit from a fishery that was now regarded as exclusively Canadian. But the severe worldwide recession in the early 1980s put an end to the provinces’ unrealistic expectations, especially those of large processing companies, several of which were forced into bankruptcy…”
“By the early 1990s, these problems converged to plunge the industry into a new crisis. Beginning in 1991, Atlantic Canada’s fisheries plummeted in the wake of moratoriums on the fishing of several species of groundfish, particularly cod…”
“In early 1982, Michael Kirby took on the additional role of Chairman of the newly created Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries. The Task Force mandate was to develop a fisheries policy for the east coast fishery, and to negotiate, with the industry and the banks, a solution to the extreme financial difficulty which virtually every company in the region was in. (Every major company was on the verge of bankruptcy. More than 40,000 jobs depended on the survival of the industry.) The Task Force Report, entitled Navigating Troubled Waters, laid the basis for a new fisheries policy - one which continues largely intact today.”
“The financial restructuring took nearly three years. It was successful to the extent that it saved a large number of fish plants and most of the jobs in the industry. (The collapse of the industry in the early 1990's arose because of the disappearance of fish stocks. The problem the Task Force faced a decade earlier was a financial problem of too much debt, too little equity and high interest rates, but an abundance of fish.) The financial restructuring was successful in that the federal and provincial governments eventually sold the shares they purchased as part of the restructuring plan and got back their entire capital investment.”
From John Cummings November 06, 2004 news release “A Kettle of Fish“:
“The mid-and-late 1980s was an important period for Canada's fisheries. For one thing, 1987 was the year that the East Coast's largest high-tech trawler fleet—previously owned by the Federal Government (63%), the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador (26%) and the Bank of Nova Scotia(11%)—was fully privatized as Fisheries Products International Ltd. (FPI), with a huge 1987 groundfish quota of about 175,000 tonnes. The privatization left the Bank of Nova Scotia indirectly holding an 8% interest in FPI.
According to Report on Business (October 1994), "Starting in 1988, even before the federal government acknowledged the extent of the fish crisis, FPI began establishing an international [fish] procurement network, setting up long-term relationships with fishing and fish-farm companies around the world."
Meanwhile, the other East Coast trawler-industry leader during the 1980s was Halifax-based National Sea Products Ltd.(NatSea), which in the early 1980s was 56% owned by the Bank of Nova Scotia and the federal government.
In 1986, NatSea went through a restructuring and the Fed's holding was reduced to 20%. By 1988, NatSea had a reported groundfish quota of 104,000 tonnes. Despite this huge quota, National Sea Products also began to invest in fish farming.
In late 1987, NatSea acquired all the outstanding shares in Pafcon Ltd., which owned a 65% interest in Pacific Aqua Foods Ltd., a salmon fish farm business in BC. By 1995, National Sea Products was involved in ten BC fish farm sites. The major shareholders in NatSea by that time were Empire Company (11%), whose biggest shareholder is the powerful Sobey family, Scotia Investments (36%), and the Canadian federal government (10%).
In March 1996, the federal government announced its intent to sell its stake in National Sea Products. At the same time, Empire Co. arranged to sell its stake to TD Securities, the merchant banking arm of the Toronto-Dominion Bank, whose board has long included Jimmy Pattison, owner of Canfisco, the second-largest fishing fleet on the West Coast.
The Feds sold off their 776,488 common shares in National Sea Products to Scotia Investments Ltd. on December 19, 1997. By that point, the BC Salmon Aquaculture Review Committee had given fish farming a "yellow light" to proceed with caution in the province.”
From 1993-2003, over $560,000 of (the only publically-available and traceable) donations from pro-fish farm industry were donated to the federal liberal party, with $360,00 from the Toronto-Dominion Bank, and $152,000 from Scotiabank. National Sea Products even contributed to David Dingwall (current Bank of Canada head) and Fred Mifflin (ex-Fisheries Minister) campaigns.
From Sarah K. Cox. 2004. Diminishing Returns - An Investigation into the Five Multinational Corporations that Control British Columbia’s Salmon Farming Industry.
http://www.raincoast.org/publicatio...ns-execsum.pdf:
p.64: “From 1996 to 2002, the Liberal party received $67,992 in donations from the aquaculture sector. (The opposition New Democratic Party, by contrast, received no contributions at all from the aquaculture industry.) By far the Liberals’ largest aquaculture donor was Stolt Sea Farm, which gave the party more than $20,000. The Omega Salmon Group was next, donating $14,460. Heritage Salmon followed a distant third, giving a comparatively small $6,820. The B.C. Salmon Farmers Association – itself funded in part by the provincial government – donated $4,765 to the Liberal Party. Marine Harvest (Nutreco) gave $1,420, violating its own corporate code of conduct, which states that: “Nutreco does not make political contributions in any of the countries where it operates.” Cermaq was the only one of the five biggest salmon farming companies in B.C. that did not make a donation to the Liberals.171 Also contributing $5,000 to the B.C. Liberal election campaign was Monty Little’s Syndel Laboratories. (See Taxpayerfunded support for agriculture.) “
Is it mere coincidence that the person who brokered the deal between the Bank of Nova Scotia and the Federal government (Senator Michael Kirby) is not only an appointed Liberal Member of the Senate of Canada, but he has been a Scotiabank director since March 2000.
What if Senator Kirby was paid-off, and as a kick-back was appointed to both the senate and the directorship of the Bank of Nova Scotia? Wouldn’t that be a criminal investigation – influence peddling?
Other Scotiabank directors include:
Dr. Parr-Johnston who served as a director of both Empire Company Limited and FPI Limited,
Paul D. Sobey who also sits on the boards of Empire Company Limited, Sobeys Inc., Emera Incorporated and Nova Scotia Power Incorporated, and
Ronald A. Brenneman, who is also President and Chief Executive Officer of Petro-Canada, and also has held positions with Imperial Oil Limited, Exxon Corporation.
How did this political influence pervade the upper echelons of Fisheries and Oceans Canada? Can we trace the connections?
corruption in DFO - the players
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DFOs direct personal involvement and familiarity with connections generated through the Aquaculture Association of Canada (AAC) the goes deep.
Yves Bastien, Sharon Ford and others have been associates through their association with AAC the as directors, executives and board and committee involvement.
http://www.mi.mun.ca/mi/aac/bod.html http://www.aquacultureassociation.ca/about/com978.html. Susan Waddy with DFO is also the AAC Office Manager and Managing Editor, while Shawn Robinson also with DFO is President.
The industry support network for the AAC is large and includes staff members such as Terry Hutchinson - Legal Counsel for Clark Drummie that has “special interest in aquaculture”.
http://www.aquacultureassociation.ca/about/office2.html. Clark Drummie also retains the services of L. Paul Zed, MP, Counsel who was also elected as a Member of the House of Commons of the 35th and 38th Parliaments; and was Assistant and Advisor to the Honourable Roméo LeBlanc, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans
http://www.clarkdrummie.ca/bio.cfm?...514D733DA3DDC1F
Sharon Ford and Dave Rideout have also been board members and executives of the Canadian Aquaculture Industry Alliance (CAIA). Members of CAIA include the Aquaculture Association of Canada, AquaHealth Ltd., B.C. Salmon Farmers Association, Blue Revolution Consulting Group Inc., Cooke Aquaculture Inc., Creative Salmon Company Ltd., EWOS Canada, Marine Harvest Canada, New Brunswick Salmon Growers Association, Panfish Canada, to name a few.
http://www.aquaculture.ca/caia/members.htm.
The CEO of Fishery Products International (FPI) is Derrick Rowe (with over $500,000 worth of shares of FPI) and he is also closely associated with CAIA.
http://www.fpil.com/cm/documents/do..._CAIA200503.pdf. Rowe is also a Director of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS), and who in 2003 told NFLD fish farmers that farmed fish was a big part of FPIs business. Other members of FPIs board include John C. Crosbie, P.C., O.C. QC. (ex-fisheries minister), and Frank C. Sobey (Chairman of Crombie Properties Limited, director of Sobey’s Inc., both subsidiaries of Empire Company Ltd.).
These names keep on appearing throughout the pro-aquaculture lobby.
For example, the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS) claims to be an “independent, non-partisan, social and economic policy think tank based in Halifax”. The Institute was founded by a “group of Atlantic Canadians” to broaden the debate about the “realistic options” available to build our economy. AIMS was incorporated as a non-profit corporation under Part II of the Canada Corporations Act and was granted charitable registration by Revenue Canada as of October 3, 1994.
However non-partisan, the AIMS Board of Directors includes:
Hon. John C. Crosbie, Ex-DFO Minister
Elizabeth Parr-Johnston, President of Parr Johnston Economic and Policy Consultants, a Scotiabank director, a senior policy analyst and director of government affairs for Inco Ltd and held numerous senior ranked positions during 10 years with Shell Canada Ltd, and when with the federal government was chief of staff and senior policy adviser to the Minister of Employment and immigration, director of economic development analysis for the department of Regional and Economic Expansion (DREE)
Derrick Rowe, Chief Executive Officer of Fishery Products International Limited, and on the International Trade Advisory Committee.
Paul D. Sobey, President and Chief Executive Officer of Empire Company Limited, a food distribution, real estate and investment company, a Director of the Bank of Nova Scotia, Sobeys Inc, Emera Inc. (a merger of Nova Scotia Power Inc. and Bangor Hydro-Electric Company).
What and who is CAIA?
The Canadian Aquaculture Industry Alliance was established in 1995 as a sector council under Human Resources Development Canada and had as its key mandate the development of issues around human resources within the aquaculture industry. Since 1999, it has become independent.
CAIA is now a pro-aquaculture lobby group. It is a reasonable assumption that CAIA would lobby for its member interests, as some of the principal objectives
http://www.aquaculture.ca/caia.htm is stated as:
To be an effective and proactive advocate for Canadian aquaculture interests in relation to national public policy;
To lead the development of a national aquaculture strategy, and to foster cooperation among aquaculture interests;
The CAIA Board has met directly with Fisheries and Oceans Minister Herb Dhaliwal and accompanied by Commissioner for Aquaculture Development Yves Bastien, Jack Taylor of the Commissioner’s office, Special Advisor Aparna Kurl, and Donna Petrachenko, DFO Regional Director General.
http://www.aquaculture.ca/English/N..._dec_page2.html
corruption in DFO - the associations
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The Executive Director of CAIA also participates on the Boards of AquaNet and the Aquaculture Collaborative Research and Development Program (ACRDP), as well as the Approvals Committee for the OCAD Aquaculture Partnership Program.
In addition, CAIA participates in the CCFAM Aquaculture Task Group (ATP); an upper-level DFO meeting, at regular intervals, in order to advance industry interests within federal policy and the environmental review process.
http://www.aquaculture.ca/English/C...ecordsOf11.html
This is where there is concern of collusion and allegations of interference within DFO and the federal system stem.
For example, Dave Rideout has been pushing for an “industry perspective” on the environmental assessment review process for some time.
http://www.aquacultureassociation.c...eview process
Rideout has also given evidence on streamlining the CEAA process through efforts like model class screening directly with the STANDING COMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND OCEANS.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/infocomdoc/37.../fopoev28-e.htm
Stewart Lindale of DFO, in a meeting with CAIA responds by stating that the “draft CEAA Guide for Finfish completed and will be shared with the ATG in July”, and he will “contact Dave Rideout to arrange date for CAIA to meet with the ATG Liaison Committee”. Does this mean that industry is dictating our environmental review process? Who is the “ATG Liaison Committee”?
http://www.aquaculture.ca/English/C...ecordsOf09.html
CAIA has well-developed connections to upper-level DFO and provincial aquaculture-related decision-makers.
http://www.aquaculture.ca/caia/AR03.htm
From Sarah K. Cox. 2004. Diminishing Returns - An Investigation into the Five Multinational Corporations that Control British Columbia’s Salmon Farming Industry.
http://www.raincoast.org/publicatio...ns-execsum.pdf:
p.76: “CAIA executive director David Rideout worked for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans before he moved to the CAIA in 2002. Rideout’s former DFO positions included that of director-general of Aquaculture Restructuring and Adjustment and executive director of the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council. Rideout is also the former director-general of fish inspection for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. B.C. Salmon Farmers Association executive director Mary Ellen Walling is a member of the CAIA’s executive committee. CAIA board members include Fraser Walsh from Heritage, Ron Gowan from Nutreco (Marine Harvest) and John Taylor from Stolt. Also, Heritage’s Gary Wadden is a member of the CAIA’s Human Resources Standing Committee.”
p.84: David Rideout is a board member of the organization “Salmon of the Americas”, along with top executives of the large multinational fish farming companies.
p.72: “The organization [CAIA] has received at least three-quarters of a million dollars from Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans since 1999”, and p.72: “1999-2003 $1,004,750 To CAIA from DFO and HRDC”
Did David Rideout use his influence in government to procure these contribution agreements, or to direct-hire industry proponents?
corruption in DFO - the plays
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DFO personnel Richard Wex, Sharon Ford, and Yves Bastien are regular attendants and participators in the CCFAM Aquaculture Task Group (ATP), as is Joan Kean-Howie, the Director General, Oceans and Aquaculture Science Branch. Other ATP participants include: Peter Underwood the Nova Scotia Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries; Al Martin, the Director of the BC Sustainable Economic Development Branch; Kim Lipsett, the NB Director of Aquaculture Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Aquaculture.
http://www.aquaculture.ca/English/C..._TaskGroup.html
How did pro-industry lobbyists get hired and gain access to the policy-making upper-levels of DFO?
Sharon Ford has a history of being an industry lobbyist. We can gleam some of the hiring processes through an appeal launched by Thomas Babcock.
http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/recours/de.../dbabcock_e.htm
It was alleged that: “Sharon Ford had been originally hired into a CO-03 position from outside the Public Service on the recommendation of the Assistant Deputy Minister [in 2001] and was subsequently was given an acting position as Director, Sustainable Aquaculture Policy…”, that:” Sharon Ford would be deployed to Mr. Wex's office”, that there was a: “purposeful delay to allow Sharon Ford to become a Public Servant and therefore be eligible to compete for the position.”, that: “Mr. Wex, Chairperson of the Selection Board, improperly acted as a reference for successful candidate, Sharon Ford.”, that: “the Selection Board members were influenced by the bias shown towards Sharon Ford by the Selection Board Chairperson.”, and that: “the department breached PSC guidelines by calling Mr. Rideout, a referee from outside the Public Service”.
Richard Wex is also the Director General of the Habitat Management Directorate within DFO, whose office is involved in developing habitat policy, including habitat referrals for CEAA for open net-cage aquaculture site applications.
http://direct.srv.gc.ca/cgi-bin/dir...o=GC,c=CA
Wex’s involvement is crucial in developing DFOs “Aquaculture Action Plan”
http://www.mi.mun.ca/mi/aac/ac2001/DFOAction.htm, and has worked closely with David Rideout on a Aquanet National Workshop, "Aquaculture Law and Policy: Towards Principled Access and Operations” (
http://www.aquanet.ca/English/resea...hp?ID=34&page=1), as well as within the CCFAM Aquaculture Task Group.
http://www.aquaculture.ca/English/C..._TaskGroup.html
How did Richard Wex get hired? Was he in conflict of interest?
The Appeal Board Chairperson for the Babcock appeal subsequently concluded that: “[20] The evidence before me showed that Sharon Ford was an indeterminate Public Servant at the time of the competitions. It is beyond my jurisdiction to inquire into the propriety of her entry into the Public Service. Therefore I cannot conclude that Sharon Ford was improperly screened into the competitions.”, and that: “This allegation is therefore dismissed”.
Who’s jurisdiction is it then to: “inquire into the propriety of pro-industry lobbyists entry into the Public Service”.??
There are other examples: Check-out Dave Conley's latest remarks at:
https://listserv.heanet.ie/cgi-bin/...d0604&L=caligus
He probably sent these from his office in Ottawa, using taxpayer money to pay for his time to do this.
Additionally:
Dave Conley is currently listed as being a Development AAROM Officer within the AQUACULTURE MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE of Fisheries and Oceans Canada at:
http://direct.srv.gc.ca/cgi-bin/dir...o=GC,c=CA
The Aboriginal Aquatic Resource & Oceans Management Program or AAROM, is a $6M federal DFO program started in 2003 that is intended “to help Aboriginal groups to participate effectively in multi-stakeholder and other advisory and decision-making processes used for aquatic resources and oceans management.”, through funding the “establishment of resource management bodies with the scientific and technical expertise that assists Aboriginal people to play a larger role in fisheries and oceans management”.
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/back.../hq-ac99a_e.htm
There are other federally-administered aquaculture funding sources.
The Aquaculture Partnership Program is administered through the Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development (
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/cad-cda/1999/cad3_e.htm). This programs fund is to “support joint strategic projects for the benefit of the entire Canadian aquaculture industry, where eligible recipients will include individuals or organizations operating within Canada who are directly involved in the aquaculture industry”.
Similarly, The Aquaculture Collaborative Research and Development Program (ACRDP) (
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/Aq...ion_final_e.htm) is a “Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) initiative to increase the level of collaborative research and development activity between the aquaculture industry and the department, and in some instances with other key funding partners. ACRDP is an industry-driven program that will pair industry with DFO researchers. Projects will be conducted at DFO Research facilities or possibly industry partner facilities. The program will allocate ACRDP funds to collaborative research projects that are proposed and jointly funded by aquaculture producer partners. Research funding remains within DFO. ACRDP funding is approximately $4.5 million per year and will be distributed regionally”.
In addition to funding the ACRDP, the federal government announced in 2000 that it would contribute $14.4 million over four years to launch a separate research and development agency called AquaNet. Like B.C.’s Aqua-E Fund, AquaNet funds researchers to investigate diseases that affect the salmon farming industry. AquaNet members include academic institutions, provincial and federal government agencies, pharmaceutical companies and salmon farming corporations. Heritage, Nutreco, Stolt, Skretting (Nutreco) and EWOS (Cermaq) are all members. So are pharmaceutical companies that manufacture fish vaccines and therapeutants: Microtek International Ltd., Schering-Plough Animal Health and Aqua Health (Novartis).
David Rideout, executive director of the Canadian Aquaculture Industry Alliance, is chair of AquaNet’s board of directors. Monty Little – president and founder of Syndel Laboratories, head of the Science Council’s AquaE Fund, and a Science Council director – is an Aquanet board member. Other AquaNet board members include Bill Robertson, director of east coast operations for Heritage Salmon, and John Taylor, chief operating officer for Stolt Sea Farm, Americas.
Out of these funds, these successful applicants, including aboriginal bodies (AAROM funds), hire contractors for co-ordination and technical advice.
Various aboriginal bands and groups have received monies from this AAROM program; some have vigourously pursued aquaculture (such as the Nuu-Chah-Nulth Tribal Council in Port Alberni BC), and hired consultants to carry-out this work.
http://www.tpsgc.gc.ca/recgen/pdf/transfer05.pdf
It is difficult to ascertain what AAROM funds or other DFO-related aquaculture funds were spent on what aquaculture-related consulting firms.
Isn’t it odd that these people are in charge of where large amounts (millions) of research dollars are committed, where they stand a good chance of benefiting themselves or their companies? Superimpose on this a funding cut-back in FOC where they state that there is no funding to look at environmental impacts of fish-farming, such as pristine levels of sea lice and other associated negative wild/cultured stock interactions. Isn’t it weird that industry in charge of directing at whether these impacts are looked-at, due to the “industry-driven” prerequisite of these funding sources? However, Jean-Claude Bouchard, Associate Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans spent $69,240 during 2003 – 2004 for travel, mostly on pro-aquaculture business.
Conley has also been deeply involved in the aquaculture business.
Previous to his current position, in 1999 Conley was the Communications Adviser to the Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development, a part of Fisheries and Oceans Canada
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/cad-cda/1999/cad3_e.htm
http://www.aquaculture.ca/English/N...june_page4.html
Previous to that, he has been listed the principal of D.C. Conley & Associates, Aquaculture Communication Consultants, as well as an advisor with Bishop Aquatic Technologies, and Fukui North America (FNA).
http://www.fukuina.com/consulting/dave_conley.htm
Other Fukui North America associates include:
Don Bishop, President, Bishop Aquatic Technologies. (BAT). Fukui North America is one of two operating divisions of Bishop Aquatic Technologies, Inc, a contributing writer to the US Publication Fish Farming News, the Canadian Atlantic Fish Farming, and French Canadian publications Peche Impact.
http://www.fukuina.com/consulting/index.htm
Mr. Daniel Stechey, President of Canadian Aquaculture Systems. He spent five years in the Canadian federal government and was chief advisor of aquaculture policy to the Canadian Fisheries Minister. Presently, Mr. Stechey also serves as a “Special Advisor to the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development”. Mr. Stechey is the Regional Aquaculture Advisor for the Aquaculture Partnership Program.
http://www.fukuina.com/consulting/daniel_stechey.htm
Brian P. Doyle, co-founder and President of Doyle Group, and Doyle Salewski Inc. , a Chartered Accountant, a Chartered Insolvency and Restructuring Practitioner, Trustee In Bankruptcy, and a Certified Fraud Examiner.
http://www.fukuina.com/consulting/brian_doyle.htm
However, Dave Conley is also currently one of the 2 principle co-owners of:
The Aquaculture Communications Group, LLC
22483 Ennishore Drive
Novi, MI 48375
U.S.A.
(
http://www.aquacomgroup.com/index.c...11&fkMainPage=0),
Other Aquaculture Communications Group associates include:
John R. M. Forster, formerly of Shearwater Fish Farming Ltd., and Stolt Sea Farms, as well as currently President of Forster Consulting Inc., and Columbia River Fish Farms.
http://aquacomgroup.com/upload/files/fil_20.pdf
Brian Kingzett, of Blue Revolution Consulting Group, Aquametrix Research, Kingzett Professional Services, and Fukui North America.
http://aquacomgroup.com/upload/files/fil_46.pdf,
http://www.fukuina.com/consulting/brian_kingzett.htm
The Aquaculture Communications Group, LLC has coordinated receptions for business and government representatives from Canada and Norway to attend aquaculture-related events, such as:
Planned, coordinated and led the Canadian Trade Mission to Norway, as well as Aqua Nor 2003 and AQUA NOR 2005, where government delegates attended, and Conley’s company received monies for this co-ordination.
corruption in DFO - the legalities
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The questions arise:
1. Is this a conflict of interest to be a government employee, while receiving additional monies from the government for your private company, or companies of your affiliated business associates?
2. How did Conley, and Stechey get hired into the Public Service, especially given these conflicts of interest?
3. Did Conley or Stechey use influence in government to get these contracts for their companies or affiliates?
4. If so - Is this influence-peddling, or a Breach of Trust in connection with the duties of his office, contrary to Sections 119-126 of the Criminal Code of Canada
5. Should the new federal accountability bill also apply?
Well what is a “conflict of interest”?
Under the “Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service” the following is dictated towards public servants:
Public servants shall give honest and impartial advice and make all information relevant to a decision available to Ministers.
Public servants must work within the laws of Canada and maintain the tradition of the political neutrality of the Public Service.
Public servants should also strive to ensure that the value of transparency in government is upheld while respecting their duties of confidentiality under the law.
Public servants shall perform their duties and arrange their private affairs so that public confidence and trust in the integrity, objectivity and impartiality of government are conserved and enhanced.
Public servants, in fulfilling their official duties and responsibilities, shall make decisions in the public interest.
If a conflict should arise between the private interests and the official duties of a public servant, the conflict shall be resolved in favour of the public interest.
Deputy Heads and senior managers (e.g. Commissioners) have a particular responsibility to exemplify, in their actions and behaviours, the values of public service.
Avoiding and preventing situations that could give rise to a conflict of interest, or the appearance of a conflict of interest, is one of the primary means by which a public servant maintains public confidence in the impartiality and objectivity of the Public Service.
They should not step out of their official roles to assist private entities or persons in their dealings with the government where this would result in preferential treatment to the entities or persons.
Section 3(4) of the federal Conflict of Interest Code (
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/oe00002e.html) states: “Public office holders shall not have private interests, other than those permitted pursuant to this Code, that would be affected particularly or significantly by government actions in which they participate”.
Additionally section 4 (2) of the same act states: “Staff of federal boards, commissions, and tribunals as defined in the Federal Court Act, separate employers as defined under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, the Canadian Armed Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and part-time ministerial or Governor in Council appointees are subject to the Principles set out in Part I and such other compliance measures as may be determined by the head of the organization in question, for whose application that individual is responsible.”, while section 4(3) states: “Crown corporations as set out in the Financial Administration Act shall be subject to compliance measures established by, and in accordance with, the established practices of their own organization”.
It appears that some, if not many of these guidelines may have been breached in this case. What if there is a deeper context by which to gauge the actions here, such as criminal wrongdoing?
Wrongdoing (actes fautifs) - is defined as an act or omission concerning:
(a)”a violation of any law or regulation; or
(b) a breach of the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service; or
(c) misuse of public funds” (including funds for baseline research to assess impacts) “or assets; or
(d) gross mismanagement; or
(e) a substantial and specific danger to the life, health and safety” (including food or environmental safety) “of Canadians or the environment”.
Someone with legal means and mandate should investigate.
corruption in DFO - the CEAA process - the crux of the problem
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Is this the end of the connections, collusions and allegations, or is there more?
Yves Bastien was appointed (and not hired through a competitive process) Commissioner for Aquaculture Development on December 17, 1998 in response to the Liberal Party’s 1994 election platform document: Securing our Future Together which stated that improved support for the aquaculture industry from the federal government and its agencies would foster more rapid growth of the industry. He has sat on various boards of directors, including the Aquaculture Association of Canada (AAC), the Canadian Aquaculture Industry Alliance (CAIA), and the World Aquaculture Society (WAS). How did the hiring process work for Bastien?
Since then, the Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development (OCAD) has recently reassigned (in 2003) 14 federal staff, including BC MAFF and industry funded biologists to review and fast-track the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) applications for the impending net-cage expansion.
http://www.johncummins.ca/news/jc2004-04-02b.htm
Is this an issue? Is there a conflict of interest?
Under section 61(2) of the CEA Act, the Federal Minister of the Environment is responsible for the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEA) and the referrals, but the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development is now in charge of the aquaculture net-cage site applications and has dictated that the applications should go through a screening process only, which then omits mandatory public involvement and scoping (determining geographic boundaries of impacts) during the assessment process.
This is a particularly relevant question since OCAD’s mandate (
http://www.ocad-bcda.gc.ca/emandate.html#Background) states that OCAD will promote the interests of the industry by development of more supportive and pro-active policies for aquaculture and enhanced leadership for aquaculture initiatives within government. This would appear to be a conflict of interest, and incompatible with the intent of the CEA Act.
Additionally, the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development is part of the Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans, while the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act is under the responsibility of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, which is part of the Ministry of the Environment. How did the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development legally assume responsibility for the CEAA referrals? Was a “Memoranda of Understanding” (MOU) signed between the two federal departments giving one jurisdiction over the other responsibilities? If an MOU exists, who signed it (e.g. Deputy Minister?), and what were the reasons given for the departmental change?
corruption in DFO - criminal behaviour?
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Was the position of public trust held by the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development breached? Are other personnel involved?
Has there been any more alleged interferences in the functioning of DFO, or developing aquaculture policy?
It has been alleged that there was higher-level interference involving a Stolt farm relocation. Apparently the industry “raised hell” through the BC Salmon Farmers Association, which contacted Yves Bastien (Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development (OCAD)) and he called Guy Beaupre (HEB Director) who directed his Aquaculture coordinator Ron Ginetz (who is now on secondment from DFO with salary paid from the fish farming industry ??) to force DFO staff to again withdraw the letter demanding a proper authorization of the farm which would have included a CEAA review. Ottawa (i.e. HEB and Ron Ginetz) was adamant that just because you install a fish farm at a site there was no proof that a harmful alteration of habitat (s.35(2)) would occur.
These are serious allegations, if they are true. Under the “Criminal Code” of Canada:
s.126. (1) states that: “Every one who, without lawful excuse, contravenes an Act of Parliament” (incl. the Fisheries Act) “by wilfully doing anything that it forbids or by wilfully omitting to do anything that it requires to be done is, unless a punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years”.
Additionally, s.380(1) states: “Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security or any service,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars (what is the cost or value of the Pacific salmon stocks?); or Offences by officers and employees of corporations”.
And (2) “Every one who, being a director, an officer, an agent or an employee of a corporation that commits, by fraud, an offence under subsection (1),
(a) knowingly takes part in the fraud, or
(b) knows or has reason to suspect that the fraud is being committed or has been or is about to be committed and does not inform the responsible government, or a department thereof, of Her Majesty, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years”.
corruption in DFO - fishy business
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Very serious allegations, indeed. The next questions would be:
Were any of these federal employees privy to any information that would have caused not only a conflict of interest, but frauded the Canadian public (i.e. the “Crown”) about the application of Section 35(2) of the Fisheries Act, due to his/her positions?
What about David Rideout, Yves Bastien, Richard Wex, Dave Conley, Sharon Ford, and Daniel Stechey? Were they privy to any information that would have caused not only a conflict of interest, but frauded the Canadian public?
An "act or omission" is defined as: “includes, for greater certainty, attempting or conspiring to commit, counselling any person to commit, aiding or abetting any person in the commission of, or being an accessory after the fact in relation to, an act or omission”, and (2) “Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence”, where “Her Majesty has been misled or mistaken in her measures”.
Similarly, "evidence" or "statement" is defined as: “an assertion of fact, opinion, belief or knowledge, whether material or not and whether admissible or not”, and "office" includes “(a) an office or appointment under the government, (b) a civil or military commission, and (c) a position or an employment in a public department”, where an "official" means a person who “(a) holds an office, or (b) is appointed to discharge a public duty”.
Section 119. (1) of the Criminal Code states: “Every one who (a) being the holder of a judicial office, or being a member of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, corruptly (i) accepts or obtains, (ii) agrees to accept, or (iii) attempts to obtain, any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment for himself or another person in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him in his official capacity, or (b) gives or offers, corruptly, to a person mentioned in paragraph (a) any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him in his official capacity for himself or another person, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years”.
Section 120. of the Criminal Code also states: “Every one who (a) being a justice, police commissioner, peace officer, public officer or officer of a juvenile court, or being employed in the administration of criminal law, corruptly (i) accepts or obtains, (ii) agrees to accept, or (iii) attempts to obtain, for himself or any other person any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment with intent (iv) to interfere with the administration of justice, (v) to procure or facilitate the commission of an offence, or (vi) to protect from detection or punishment a person who has committed or who intends to commit an offence, or (b) gives or offers, corruptly, to a person mentioned in paragraph (a) any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment with intent that the person should do anything mentioned in subparagraph (a)(iv), (v) or (vi), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years”.
s122 of the Criminal Code states: “Every official who, in connection with the duties of his office, commits fraud or a breach of trust is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, whether or not the fraud or breach of trust would be an offence if it were committed in relation to a private person.”
And finally, s121 of the Criminal Code states: “(1) Every one commits an offence who (a) directly or indirectly (i) gives, offers or agrees to give or offer to an official or to any member of his family, or to any one for the benefit of an official, or (ii) being an official, demands, accepts or offers or agrees to accept from any person for himself or another person, a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence or an act or omission in connection with (iii) the transaction of business with or any matter of business relating to the government, or (iv) a claim against Her Majesty or any benefit that Her Majesty is authorized or is entitled to bestow, whether or not, in fact, the official is able to cooperate, render assistance, exercise influence or do or omit to do what is proposed, as the case may be; (b) having dealings of any kind with the government, pays a commission or reward to or confers an advantage or benefit of any kind on an employee or official of the government with which he deals, or to any member of his family, or to any one for the benefit of the employee or official, with respect to those dealings, unless he has the consent in writing of the head of the branch of government with which he deals, the proof of which lies on him; (c) being an official or employee of the government, demands, accepts or offers or agrees to accept from a person who has dealings with the government a commission, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind directly or indirectly, by himself or through a member of his family or through any one for his benefit, unless he has the consent in writing of the head of the branch of government that employs him or of which he is an official, the proof of which lies on him; (d) having or pretending to have influence with the government or with a minister of the government or an official, demands, accepts or offers or agrees to accept for himself or another person a reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence or an act or omission in connection with (i) anything mentioned in subparagraph (a)(iii) or (iv), or (ii) the appointment of any person, including himself, to an office; (e) gives, offers or agrees to give or offer to a minister of the government or an official a reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence or an act or omission in connection with (i) anything mentioned in subparagraph (a)(iii) or (iv), or (2) Every one who (a) by suppression of the truth, in the case of a person who is under a duty to disclose the truth, (b) by threats or deceit, or (c) by any unlawful means ‘…
Did the fish farming companies receive a commission or reward or confered an advantage or benefit of any kind (such as successful site application and side-stepping the CEAA process) by an employee or official of the government? Did it cause the “official of the government” to influence an “act or omission”, such as the application of section 35(2) of the Fisheries Act?
corruption in DFO - the fisheries act
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Well what is Section 35(2) of the Fisheries Act?
Under Subsection 35(2) of the Fisheries Act, “harmful alteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitat” such as: “spawning grounds and nursery, rearing, food supply and migration areas on which fish depend” is prohibited.
Appendix 6 of the Fisheries Act Guide identifies unacceptable HADDs for which DFO would not issue a subsection 35(2) Fisheries Act authorization’s for habitat such as spawning areas, or restricted migration routes, etc. Migratory routes are not identified in the current CEAA screening process. Why?
FOC managers are required to review the following when reviewing aquaculture tenure applications:
1. Is fish habitat present at the project site or in an area potentially impacted by the project?
2. Could the proposed project cause of “Harmful Alteration, Disruption or Destruction” (HADD) of fish habitat?
3. Can the impacts to fish habitat be fully mitigated?
4. Should the HADD be authorized?
5. Can the HADD be compensated?
Fish habitat is then defined as “those physical, chemical and biological attributes of the environment (e.g. substrate type and structure, aquatic macrophytes, water depth, water velocity, water temperature, dissolved oxygen, riparian vegetation, etc.) which are required by fish to carry out their life processes (e.g. spawning, nursery, rearing, feeding, overwintering, migration)”.
Although not defined in the Fisheries Act, HADD of fish habitat is defined in the “Decision Framework for the Determination and Authorization of Harmful Alteration, Disruption or Destruction of Fish Habitat” as:
“any change in fish habitat that reduces its capacity to support one or more life processes of fish. In assessing a project proposal for its potential to cause a HADD, habitat managers identify changes to the bio-physical attributes that would be of a type and magnitude sufficient to render the habitat less suitable, or unsuitable, for supporting a fish’s life processes.”
Sea lice and their free-swimming juvenile stages, as well as other disease vectors are a “biological attribute” of fish habitat, and an increase in background levels that affect the long-term health of one or more fish stocks would be at the very least a “harmful alteration” or even a “destruction”, dependent upon scope and longevity of the problem.
In fact, the federal government was so concerned about the issue that a working group spearheaded by the Pest Management Regulatory Agency, was convened in February 1996 in Ottawa, comprising federal and provincial government officials, salmon producer groups, pesticide and drug manufacturers and researchers. Delegates were then sent by Canada to one of the first workshops on sea lice control in Trondheim Norway in November 1997 (
http://www.ecoserve.ie/).
It is unclear what progress this group has achieved in the nearly 8 years to date, as it may have been decommissioned since the Office of the Commissioner for Aquaculture Development was created on December 17, 1998. Who decommissioned the working group and why? What was the significant change that precluded the importance of the working group? Did all sea lice suddenly die? Was the issue of sea lice successfully resolved so that the wild salmon stocks of Canada and other affected nations were now protected?
Also section 36 (3) of the Fisheries Act states: “Subject to subsection (4), no person shall deposit or permit the deposit of a deleterious substance of any type in water frequented by fish or in any place under any conditions where the deleterious substance or any other deleterious substance that results from the deposit of the deleterious substance may enter any such water”.
A "deleterious substance" is defined as:
· any substance that, if added to any water, would degrade or alter or form part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality of that water so that it is rendered or is likely to be rendered deleterious to fish or fish habitat or to the use by man of fish that frequent that water” which would include anti-louse treatments and anti-fouling chemicals for nets such as tin and copper compounds, or
· “any water that contains a substance in such quantity or concentration, or that has been so treated, processed or changed, by heat or other means, from a natural state that it would, if added to any other water, degrade or alter or form part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality of that water so that it is rendered or is likely to be rendered deleterious to fish or fish habitat or to the use by man of fish that frequent that water”.
There are also additional relevant sections within the Fisheries Act:
Section 78.2 of the Fisheries Act states: “Where a corporation commits an offence under this Act, any officer, director or agent of the corporation who directed, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in or participated in the commission of the offence is a party to and guilty of the offence and is liable on conviction to the punishment provided for the offence, whether or not the corporation has been prosecuted.”
Section 32 of the Fisheries Act states: “No person shall destroy fish by any means other than fishing except as authorized by the Minister or under regulations made by the Governor in Council under this Act”.
Why is it, that all the other industries that are potentially-threatening to fish habitat (e.g. pulp mills, pipelines, etc.) have all “triggered HADD” (either applied or been prosecuted under section 35(2) of the Fisheries Act), except one – the only one IN THE WATER – the open net-cage industry?
Why is it if you let clean rinse water from a net-washing operation leach into a creek, you are in contravention of section 35(2) (HADD) of the Fisheries Act, while if you load it up with fresh toxic chemicals, it’s okay to set it out front of that same creek in the ocean on a pen, with thousands of more interactions, risk and impacts to deal with?
Why is it that to date, this has not happened with the open net-cage operations for sea lice releases or toxic chemical releases? Why has “HADD” not been applied there?
Maybe it is because if a “HADD” is triggered by the review of the site application by FOC managers, a Canadian Environmental Assessment (CEA) is initiated – a full assessment, or even a panel review with mandatory public involvement and scoping (determining geographic boundaries of impacts) during the assessment process.
The current site applications do not identify things such as larger oceanographic patterns of water circulation, or smolt migration patterns. Instead site applications only look at effects that are within an arbitrary and scientifically indefensible 1 km radius. This speaks to the lack of scope and small scale included in the assessment process, both of which are inappropriate given the wide scope and large scale of potential impacts.
The assumption for the 1 km radius is presumably that fish only swim 1 km. Many inland salmon smolts swim tens, if not hundreds of km downstream to the ocean, and potentially circulate thousands of km first South to North along the coast, then out to the Alaska gyre, and back again along the same route.
If scoping was included, it would have to be accepted that fish do swim - that they swim more than 1km, and that they swim into Alaska waters. This means that CEAA open net-cage applications would then be bumped into the highest CEAA process - the panel review, due to transboundary effects - and the Alaskans would then be invited to participate on the board. Alaska - where open net-cage Atlantic salmon aquaculture is illegal.
Currently however, if you have a complaint about this process – too bad, because since public input is not mandatory - neither is it effective
Were government-paid lawyers used to determine this potential loop-hole? Who was responsible for defrauding the public and the Crown?
The Commissioner for Aquaculture Development has since his report in 2001, (
http://www.iigr.ca/pdf/documents/11...and_Regulat.pdf) been trying to promote the idea that if new aquaculture net-cage site applications are only now falling within the CEAA process (due to navigational concerns only, not necessarily environmental concerns), they should prescribe a screening process only, not a full review, due to: “predictable and mitigable environmental effects”.
On page 22, he states: "class screening could help reduce the costs while ensuring the quality of assessments", and with more detail on page 32, and 42-43.
corruption in DFO - the final chapter is yet to be written
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Check-out the document at:
http://ibew-fioe2228.ca/en/whatsnew...p final_e.doc
The document says the author is Jocelyn Bellefeuille internally whom I can't find listed with DFO, but externally N. Regimbal of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada out of Gatineau, Quebec is quoted as the author. Not sure who in DFO commissioned the report, and who the consultant was. Be interesting to find-out.
on page 18, note "To achieve an integrated fisheries and aquaculture program, Fisheries Management and Aquaculture will be joined and renamed Fisheries and Aquaculture Management. A new position, Executive Director of Aquaculture, has been created".
on page 21:" Reducing and eliminating low risk Fisheries Act habitat referrals based on a risk management framework using expanded class authorizations, greater engagement of third parties, new policies, guidelines, best practices, and new regulations; Streamlining the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) review process by adding low impact projects to the CEAA exclusion list, developing class screenings and putting greater onus on proponents"
on page 23:"An example is the proposal to pre-classify aquatic space as low, medium or high risk for aquaculture siting purposes, so that the Department can move away from the current reactive practice of site-by-site assessment".
How can you do this without even knowing pristine sea lice levels, smolt migration routes, and marine holding and rearing areas? Yet, they want to, because industry is pushing this along...
on page 27:"Consolidate and streamline authorizations for Aquaculture Reviews (as an interim to Regulatory Change)", and "Develop best management practices, guidelines and facts sheets for activities have little or no risk to fish habitat or low-sensitivity habitat", and "Reduce number of referrals".
In other words - Look the other way, and lie...
Another important policy change is the recommendation and direction on page 32, that:: "Discontinue internal support for the Consultation Framework and Toolbox"
This means that DFO wants to walk away from the PFRCC, and other advisory bodies.
Since 2001, somehow the OCAD has insinuated his office into the habitat branch that oversees the CEAA referrals for open net-cages. Who made that decision? Why isn't the OCAD part of the Ministry of Industry, rather than DFO?
That's because the OCAD wouldn't have been effective in collusion with industry - by making the changes necessary to defraud the Canadian public.
Check-out the recommendations OCAD had made directly to the Fisheries Minister in his report “Report of the Office of Aquaculture Development to the Minister of Fisheries - Recommendations for Change”.
His “team” that co-authored the report included: Darlene Elie, Jack Taylor, Dave Conley, Éric Gilbert, Stephen Lanteigne, Andrée-Anne Guibord, Kim Anglehart, Dan Stechey, and Liliana Rodríguez-Maynez – many familiar names.
Recommendations of this report include the recommendation that:
the federal government establish regulations pursuant to S. 36 of the Fisheries Act to authorize the deposition of deleterious substances in relation to aquaculture operations, establish in law, acceptable standards for the environmental impacts of aquaculture, the federal government enact a regulation under S.43 of the Fisheries Act which would give Habitat officers discretion to avoid having to consider whether a new or proposed aquaculture operation was likely to cause a harmful alteration, disruption or destruction (HADD) under S.s. 35(2) of the Fisheries Act, development of class-type screenings for aquaculture under CEAA [and not a full CEAA review],
DFO would have to make adjustments to orientations, priorities, resourcing and staffing to effectively play the lead agency role required for continued development of the industry
On March 30th 2004, federal Fisheries Minister Regan promised to implement the changes. Why ?
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/news...4/hq-ac30_e.htm
As a contrast, check-out the 2004 report of the Commissionaire of the Environment and Sustainable Development, at:
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/rep...20041005ce.html
S5.47 states:" Since March 2004, the Department has approved a national Consultation Framework and Toolbox (the Toolbox provides a description of the consultation process, tools and templates, and references and resources), and adopted a policy to govern advisory bodies. In the Pacific Region, the Department has also established an integrated salmon advisory process. "
Also, in the same article look-at S.5.62 that talks about a "Need for a risk-based and streamlined approach ".
S.5.90 is particularly pertinent, as it states: “there are no guidelines about locating salmon aquaculture sites at a specific distance from rivers frequented by wild salmon and areas of sensitive fish habitat, wildlife, or shellfish beds ".
S.5.99 is another particularly pertinent section, as it talks about: "Lack of progress to deal with the deposit of deleterious substances ".
The 1999 National Referral Study (Blueprint Project Team on National Guidelines) concluded that the Habitat Management Program has “tended to manage development referrals reactively rather than proactively. As a result, the level of effort spent reviewing some activities have been disproportionate to the level of risk that the referral poses to fisheries and fish habitat”. The 1999 National Study also concluded that FOC enforcement measures were “fragmented and inconsistent, and that compliance monitoring was inadequate” (
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/publication_e.htm#oceans).
What if there has been a “team” of people committed and organized to defrauding the Canadian public – to further their own agendas and conflicts of interests? Wouldn’t that be the definition of “organized crime”?
I believe this issue needs prompt RCMP investigation to restore the public confidence in the system.
