http://www.ssopfund.ca/en/incidents
Canadian Oil Spill Incidents 2013–2014
Canadian Oil Spill Incidents 2013–2014
Legally, oil spill response appropriate: maritime lawyer
- Thread starter agentaqua
- Start date
- Status
http://www.livingoceans.org/sites/default/files/Who-Pays-factsheet.pdf
"maximum amount of money available to deal with a worst-case scenario oil tanker spill in Canadian waters is approximately $1.33B CAD. funds may fall drastically short of what is needed to adequately clean up and pay compensation in the event of a spill, given that the price tag from the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska was at least $3.5B USD. price does not include losses from passive-use industries such as sport fishing and tourism, which were estimated at another $2.8B USD."
"maximum amount of money available to deal with a worst-case scenario oil tanker spill in Canadian waters is approximately $1.33B CAD. funds may fall drastically short of what is needed to adequately clean up and pay compensation in the event of a spill, given that the price tag from the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska was at least $3.5B USD. price does not include losses from passive-use industries such as sport fishing and tourism, which were estimated at another $2.8B USD."
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http://wcel.org/resources/environme...elspill-kinder-morgan-neb’s-crisis-legitimacy
West Coast reacts to promise of BC’s Climate Action Plan 2.0, calls for increase in carbon tax
#VancouverOilSpill, Kinder Morgan & the NEB’s crisis of legitimacy
15 April, 2015
Beaches continue to be closed in Burrard Inlet, including the iconic sea wall. Photo by Eugene Kung.
Last week’s heartbreaking oil spill in English Bay was a sobering reminder to us all about what is at risk in this beautiful part of the world, and in the Salish Sea in particular. It also made clear that ‘world leading’ spill response has a long way to go to before we can consider it effective. Many people on the scene were quick to draw the connection to the risks posed by Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Pipeline and Tankers Expansion Project (KMX) and the 700% increase in tar sand filled super tankers that it would enable.
The spill also serves as a reminder about why it is important for the Provincial, municipal and First Nations governments, not to mention the public at large, to have an understanding of emergency response plans in order to decide for themselves whether the risks posed by the Kinder Morgan Expansion can be mitigated or whether the purported benefits outweigh the risks. As you may recall, the National Energy Board recently denied a motion by the Province of BC to have Kinder Morgan’s spill plans made public, even though similar plans were made available under Washington State legal requirements. This move was so unpopular that even NEB chair Peter Watson has criticized the pipeline industry’s lack of transparency about emergency response plans.
A litany of complaints
This, of course, is not the first time the NEB has faced criticism for the way it has handled the Kinder Morgan Expansion review process – the drumbeat of criticism has been constant from day one.
Almost immediately after the hearing order was issued on April 2, 2014, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation filed a legal challenge in the Federal Court of Appeal citing several legal errors and constitutional deficiencies. The hearing order started clock on the 15-month statutory time limit, despite missing key information about a final route, human health risk assessments, geotechnical information, tanker traffic and safety, and the aforementioned emergency response plans.
Indeed, the myriad of criticisms (too numerous to list exhaustively) includes limiting public participation and expression (now seeking leave at the Supreme Court of Canada); excluding climate change from its scope (see our own comment on the absurdity of trying to exclude climate change from a review of an oil pipeline); inadequate testing of the evidence by cross examination or even answering the written questions asked; and participant funding disputes with directly affected landowners to name a few. In the course of one year, the process has managed to draw complaints from residents, local businesses, municipal governments, First Nations and the BC Provincial government.
The general dissatisfaction with the NEB’s process was punctuated by former BC Hydro CEO Marc Eilessen when he withdrew from the hearing in November 2014, calling it a “fraudulent process” and a “public deception” while suggesting that the NEB was “a truly industry-captured regulator.”
Further, a group of 12 First Nations intervenors sent an open letter to Minister of Natural Resources Greg Rickford, questioning the constitutionality of the process and citing numerous deficiencies with the process itself.
Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, Ta’ah Amy George, and Rueben George were among the thousands who gathered at Burnaby Mountain in November, 2014. Photo by Eugene Kung.
The public’s frustration with the NEB and Kinder Morgan came to a head last November with a mountain of opposition emerging during contested test-drilling on Burnaby Mountain over two rain-soaked and muddy weeks.
And no wonder; the NEB was not set up to complete a thorough, holistic review of KMX. Following the gutting of Canada’s environmental laws in 2012, the NEB became the sole federal regulator responsible for reviewing KMX, including the conduct of the Environmental Assessment. CEA 2012 legislated a 15 month time frame for the NEB to complete its review, which was extended by 7 months last summer when Kinder Morgan decided it was easier to drill through a mountain than convince people their pipeline was a good idea.
Since that initial extension, the NEB has been loath to prolong its schedule any further, despite Kinder Morgan’s repeated failure to provide the information they promised in a timely manner, resulting in a limited opportunity to test that evidence. Instead, the NEB squeezed three additional rounds of written requests into the current timeline on key issues such as seismic risk and tanker traffic safety.
Two weeks ago, 7 local mayors released an open letter citing ‘no confidence’ in the NEB process, stating:
It has become apparent that the NEB process does not constitute a 'public hearing' and is completely inadequate to assess the health and safety risks of a proposed pipeline through major metropolitan areas, and the potential risks of shipping bitumen oil to Burnaby and through Burrard Inlet, the Salish Sea, and along the coastline of British Columbia.
We have serious concerns that the current NEB panel is neither independent from the oil industry proponents nor ready or able to assess the public interest of British Columbians.
NEB and social license
I joined WCEL in 2014 to oppose the KMX which crosses through my hometown of Burnaby, after having practiced regulatory law before the BC Utilities Commission for 5 years with the BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre. I have never seen or heard of a regulatory process that was so extensively criticized by such a wide swath of participants.
What is happening in the KMX hearing is a cautionary tale for those participating in other NEB processes, such as TransCanada’s Energy East pipeline review, now underway. In fact, things may get worse, not better as the NEB recently announced that it was going to cut its operating budget nearly 1/4 over the next two years.
This is not how you build social licence for a project. It’s how you destroy it.
[Social Licence to Operate] is in effect a recognition that that the views and aspirations of stakeholders that are or may be impacted by a project (such as local communities and non-governmental organizations) can make a critical difference in whether a project proceeds or not. […] In a context where Canada’s environmental laws are being aggressively weakened in favour of big resource companies, and where many Canadians are feeling alienated and excluded from formal environmental decision-making, [the concept of social licence] is rapidly gaining importance.
A sobering reminder
Many of us were heartbroken, distraught and angry with last week’s spill and bumbled response as the reality of the impacts of an oil spill literally hit home. It was a sobering reminder of what we are fighting to protect – the beautiful and precious Salish Sea. Kinder Morgan and the NEB were not responsible for this spill, (although Kinder Morgan may in fact profit from it); however, the fact that it was a comparatively small spill from a brand new ship on its maiden voyage makes clear that spills happen, and there aren’t enough conditions for approval that can change that. And when they do happen, we cannot rely on ‘world leading’ spill response to be effective. So let us never forget, so that it never happens again.
By Eugene Kung, Staff Counsel
West Coast reacts to promise of BC’s Climate Action Plan 2.0, calls for increase in carbon tax
#VancouverOilSpill, Kinder Morgan & the NEB’s crisis of legitimacy
15 April, 2015
Beaches continue to be closed in Burrard Inlet, including the iconic sea wall. Photo by Eugene Kung.
Last week’s heartbreaking oil spill in English Bay was a sobering reminder to us all about what is at risk in this beautiful part of the world, and in the Salish Sea in particular. It also made clear that ‘world leading’ spill response has a long way to go to before we can consider it effective. Many people on the scene were quick to draw the connection to the risks posed by Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Pipeline and Tankers Expansion Project (KMX) and the 700% increase in tar sand filled super tankers that it would enable.
The spill also serves as a reminder about why it is important for the Provincial, municipal and First Nations governments, not to mention the public at large, to have an understanding of emergency response plans in order to decide for themselves whether the risks posed by the Kinder Morgan Expansion can be mitigated or whether the purported benefits outweigh the risks. As you may recall, the National Energy Board recently denied a motion by the Province of BC to have Kinder Morgan’s spill plans made public, even though similar plans were made available under Washington State legal requirements. This move was so unpopular that even NEB chair Peter Watson has criticized the pipeline industry’s lack of transparency about emergency response plans.
A litany of complaints
This, of course, is not the first time the NEB has faced criticism for the way it has handled the Kinder Morgan Expansion review process – the drumbeat of criticism has been constant from day one.
Almost immediately after the hearing order was issued on April 2, 2014, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation filed a legal challenge in the Federal Court of Appeal citing several legal errors and constitutional deficiencies. The hearing order started clock on the 15-month statutory time limit, despite missing key information about a final route, human health risk assessments, geotechnical information, tanker traffic and safety, and the aforementioned emergency response plans.
Indeed, the myriad of criticisms (too numerous to list exhaustively) includes limiting public participation and expression (now seeking leave at the Supreme Court of Canada); excluding climate change from its scope (see our own comment on the absurdity of trying to exclude climate change from a review of an oil pipeline); inadequate testing of the evidence by cross examination or even answering the written questions asked; and participant funding disputes with directly affected landowners to name a few. In the course of one year, the process has managed to draw complaints from residents, local businesses, municipal governments, First Nations and the BC Provincial government.
The general dissatisfaction with the NEB’s process was punctuated by former BC Hydro CEO Marc Eilessen when he withdrew from the hearing in November 2014, calling it a “fraudulent process” and a “public deception” while suggesting that the NEB was “a truly industry-captured regulator.”
Further, a group of 12 First Nations intervenors sent an open letter to Minister of Natural Resources Greg Rickford, questioning the constitutionality of the process and citing numerous deficiencies with the process itself.
Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, Ta’ah Amy George, and Rueben George were among the thousands who gathered at Burnaby Mountain in November, 2014. Photo by Eugene Kung.
The public’s frustration with the NEB and Kinder Morgan came to a head last November with a mountain of opposition emerging during contested test-drilling on Burnaby Mountain over two rain-soaked and muddy weeks.
And no wonder; the NEB was not set up to complete a thorough, holistic review of KMX. Following the gutting of Canada’s environmental laws in 2012, the NEB became the sole federal regulator responsible for reviewing KMX, including the conduct of the Environmental Assessment. CEA 2012 legislated a 15 month time frame for the NEB to complete its review, which was extended by 7 months last summer when Kinder Morgan decided it was easier to drill through a mountain than convince people their pipeline was a good idea.
Since that initial extension, the NEB has been loath to prolong its schedule any further, despite Kinder Morgan’s repeated failure to provide the information they promised in a timely manner, resulting in a limited opportunity to test that evidence. Instead, the NEB squeezed three additional rounds of written requests into the current timeline on key issues such as seismic risk and tanker traffic safety.
Two weeks ago, 7 local mayors released an open letter citing ‘no confidence’ in the NEB process, stating:
It has become apparent that the NEB process does not constitute a 'public hearing' and is completely inadequate to assess the health and safety risks of a proposed pipeline through major metropolitan areas, and the potential risks of shipping bitumen oil to Burnaby and through Burrard Inlet, the Salish Sea, and along the coastline of British Columbia.
We have serious concerns that the current NEB panel is neither independent from the oil industry proponents nor ready or able to assess the public interest of British Columbians.
NEB and social license
I joined WCEL in 2014 to oppose the KMX which crosses through my hometown of Burnaby, after having practiced regulatory law before the BC Utilities Commission for 5 years with the BC Public Interest Advocacy Centre. I have never seen or heard of a regulatory process that was so extensively criticized by such a wide swath of participants.
What is happening in the KMX hearing is a cautionary tale for those participating in other NEB processes, such as TransCanada’s Energy East pipeline review, now underway. In fact, things may get worse, not better as the NEB recently announced that it was going to cut its operating budget nearly 1/4 over the next two years.
This is not how you build social licence for a project. It’s how you destroy it.
[Social Licence to Operate] is in effect a recognition that that the views and aspirations of stakeholders that are or may be impacted by a project (such as local communities and non-governmental organizations) can make a critical difference in whether a project proceeds or not. […] In a context where Canada’s environmental laws are being aggressively weakened in favour of big resource companies, and where many Canadians are feeling alienated and excluded from formal environmental decision-making, [the concept of social licence] is rapidly gaining importance.
A sobering reminder
Many of us were heartbroken, distraught and angry with last week’s spill and bumbled response as the reality of the impacts of an oil spill literally hit home. It was a sobering reminder of what we are fighting to protect – the beautiful and precious Salish Sea. Kinder Morgan and the NEB were not responsible for this spill, (although Kinder Morgan may in fact profit from it); however, the fact that it was a comparatively small spill from a brand new ship on its maiden voyage makes clear that spills happen, and there aren’t enough conditions for approval that can change that. And when they do happen, we cannot rely on ‘world leading’ spill response to be effective. So let us never forget, so that it never happens again.
By Eugene Kung, Staff Counsel
S
steelmadness
Guest
It was a fuel leak in a grain ship. Not an oil spill from a tanker. Are you saying your against an increase in all shipping ? The people that annoy me the most are the ones who want to preserve B.C. like some sort of time-less diorama. No matter what,best case scenario, were going to need oil for a while. It's gotta come from somewhere. It's gotta be sent somewhere. Let's focus all of our attention on seeing the future of Canadian oil being mined and transported in the safest way possible. Everyone of us consumed hydrocarbons today.....and will tomorrow, get over yourselves.
salmon slayer
Active Member
Well said steel madness. There are hundreds of ships that anchor in English bay every year. Does everyone think that this is the first time this has happened in the last 50 years. Just like earlier this year when that ship had a mechanical problem off the charlottes. It's news right now and serves the politicians to make it a scare story for the news. There is oil that is spilled daily for all kinds of vessels (small and large). Why is that on the news. With everyone's logic, there should be no ships on the ocean except sail boats as well as no railroad system.
Why don't people look at the facts.
Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
Why don't people look at the facts.
Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk
S
steelmadness
Guest
And to argue about the slow response on a boom. It was 2,700 liters....thats like a thimble in a swimming pool. To put it into perspective a small highway tanker truck holds about 28,000 liters.Almost 40% sank below the depth of an oil absorbant boom. That leaves around 1700 liters to capture. Without even knowing what ship it was. Take a rational minute to think about that... How would having a coast guard on site helped ? It didn't in the past.
If the "you're" in your post is in relation to my above posts, SM - no, of course not. I am assuming, however - you query is rhetorical since I am but reposting news articles/Op Eds. It should be obvious that effort is to inform people and generate dialogue through information exchange.
And yes - this particular incident was "only" either a "leak" (i.e. grounding/accident?) in the double-bottoms of a cargo V/L, or an oily discharge from pumping the bilges in port. It was - however - a wake-up call over spill response and safety of shipping - particularly after the past few years of proposed pipelines with tankers attached to one end.
I would also add that many people in BC should be more informed about commercial shipping and the realities and consequences of things like oil spills than people who work in the production end in the tar sands - who are isolated from those particular consequences. BC takes the risk and the consequences of any major marine incidents involving the shipping of dilbit and other petroleum products from the tar sands.
The unfortunate reality is that once the oil hits the water - is too late.
So - why ship large quantities of oil where you don't have to - especially through dangerous places?
Why not keep the refining jobs in Canada rather than ship raw product to China?
I think we probably all know the answer to that question, already.
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2 things SM;
1/ The "sinking" part you mention - is one of the problems with oil recovery and heavy petroleum products like bunker and dilbit. You can't recover those products - or very little of them. The 40% part of the product that sank did not mysteriously sink all the way to Hades and out of the environment. It had to go to the bottom, and will remain there for some years - all the time releasing PAHs and other nasty constituents that work their way up the food chain and often into our lives - causing many problems for many years. It is only "out of sight - out of mind" for those who don't have to live with those consequences - like politicians and industry pundits in Calgary, Ottawa, and Houston.
Yet look at the legacy of the Valdez spill - or more recently the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf. You don't really think the oil products sunk in these spills are "no problem" - do you?
2/ As far as your assertion about having staff in Kitsilano to help deal with this - why not ask someone who actually knows about this - like the retired Coast Guard Commander Frederick E. Moxey quoted in post #37, 04-16-2015, 04:20 PM: http://www.vancouverobserver.com/na...er-casts-doubt-claims-excellent-spill-cleanup
"Moxey contradicted this, stating that the Kitsilano base responded to oil spills as well as search and rescue before it was shut down.
"It was a 24-hour-a-day operation," he said. "All the officers and crew at Kitsilano were trained and had responded to oil spills as well as search and rescue. For her to say that is just false and I will sign an affidavit declaring the fact we were and had been called to respond to spills often.""
Speaking of: "taking a rational minute to think about that"...
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http://www.onearth.org/earthwire/ca...e=fb&utm_medium=post&utm_campaign=socialmedia
Now You See It…
Thanks to the BP oil disaster, this Louisiana barrier island is washing away.
BY Susan Cosier | @SusanCosier
<iframe width="730" height="456" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/UkATPicHIo4" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
At this time five years ago, Cat Island, off the coast of Louisiana, was getting ready for breeding season. In spring, rare and endangered birds, like brown pelicans, come from all over to nest on this 5.5-acre spit in the sea, the Gulf region's fourth-largest rookery. After hatching, chicks would imprint on the place and later return to lay their own eggs in its eight-foot mangroves. Then on April 20, 2010, disaster struck. The Deepwater Horizon blowout began to spew oil into the Gulf of Mexico for 87 days straight.
As this National Geographic video shows, oil infiltrated Cat Island, killing the root system of its mangrove forest. Without those roots to hold the island together, the sea began to wash the island’s sediment away. Cat Island is disappearing. The birds that now return to their hatching grounds have nowhere to raise their chicks. Instead of flying elsewhere, they just don’t breed at all. If only this island had nine lives.
Now You See It…
Thanks to the BP oil disaster, this Louisiana barrier island is washing away.
BY Susan Cosier | @SusanCosier
<iframe width="730" height="456" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/UkATPicHIo4" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
At this time five years ago, Cat Island, off the coast of Louisiana, was getting ready for breeding season. In spring, rare and endangered birds, like brown pelicans, come from all over to nest on this 5.5-acre spit in the sea, the Gulf region's fourth-largest rookery. After hatching, chicks would imprint on the place and later return to lay their own eggs in its eight-foot mangroves. Then on April 20, 2010, disaster struck. The Deepwater Horizon blowout began to spew oil into the Gulf of Mexico for 87 days straight.
As this National Geographic video shows, oil infiltrated Cat Island, killing the root system of its mangrove forest. Without those roots to hold the island together, the sea began to wash the island’s sediment away. Cat Island is disappearing. The birds that now return to their hatching grounds have nowhere to raise their chicks. Instead of flying elsewhere, they just don’t breed at all. If only this island had nine lives.
Attachments
Exxon Valdez oil spill
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exxon_Valdez_oil_spill
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/21/exxon-valdez-25th-anniversary/6707983/
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.cfm?FA=facts.QA
http://response.restoration.noaa.go.../significant-incidents/exxon-valdez-oil-spill
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/Publications/ProcRpt/PR 2006-08.pdf
http://www.int-res.com/articles/meps2005/301/m301p253.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exxon_Valdez_oil_spill
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/21/exxon-valdez-25th-anniversary/6707983/
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.cfm?FA=facts.QA
http://response.restoration.noaa.go.../significant-incidents/exxon-valdez-oil-spill
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/Publications/ProcRpt/PR 2006-08.pdf
http://www.int-res.com/articles/meps2005/301/m301p253.pdf
Clint r
Well-Known Member
Copied from Castanets news servce.
Photo: The Canadian Press
The Canadian Press - Apr 19 9:00 am
A B.C. First Nation is demanding to play a "priority-one role" in responses to oil spills, following last week's toxic fuel spill in English Bay.
The Squamish Nation says it is determined to protect valuable fisheries and other marine resources within its territory, which spans Vancouver Harbour, English Bay and the beaches of North and West Vancouver.
Chief Ian Campbell says the recent spill shows the federal government has a long way to go before it meets a commitment made last year to have a "world class" tanker safety system including marine safety in aboriginal communities.
He says the incident shows that a bigger spill response system must include all marine traffic in Vancouver's port, not just focusing on oil tankers.
Campbell says his nation is insisting on being called first after a spill, on the same priority list as the City of Vancouver and the provincial government.
The MV Marathassa dumped at least 2,700 litres of bunker fuel into English Bay last Wednesday and quickly spread to beaches along Stanley Park and North and West Vancouver.
Photo: The Canadian Press
The Canadian Press - Apr 19 9:00 am
A B.C. First Nation is demanding to play a "priority-one role" in responses to oil spills, following last week's toxic fuel spill in English Bay.
The Squamish Nation says it is determined to protect valuable fisheries and other marine resources within its territory, which spans Vancouver Harbour, English Bay and the beaches of North and West Vancouver.
Chief Ian Campbell says the recent spill shows the federal government has a long way to go before it meets a commitment made last year to have a "world class" tanker safety system including marine safety in aboriginal communities.
He says the incident shows that a bigger spill response system must include all marine traffic in Vancouver's port, not just focusing on oil tankers.
Campbell says his nation is insisting on being called first after a spill, on the same priority list as the City of Vancouver and the provincial government.
The MV Marathassa dumped at least 2,700 litres of bunker fuel into English Bay last Wednesday and quickly spread to beaches along Stanley Park and North and West Vancouver.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-5-years-later-1.3037641
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 5 years later
Louisiana residents say effects of massive 2010 Gulf of Mexico spill still being felt
By Paul Hunter, CBC News Posted: Apr 19, 2015 11:25 AM ET| Last Updated: Apr 19, 2015 11:25 AM ET
CBC'S Paul Hunter returns to the Gulf Coast to see how the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill is still affecting the region and its people. 10:28
Related Stories
■BP oil spill: The economic and environmental cost, 5 years later
■Bill C-22 would rewrite the rules for oil spill cleanups
■BP appeals Gulf oil spill ruling of up to $18B in damages
■'Reckless' BP gets most blame for 2010 oil spill, judge rules
■Halliburton to pay $1.1B US to settle Deepwater Horizon oil spill claims
■BP oil spill: Concerns for long-term health of workers 4 years later
Five years after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, residents and ecologists say the effects of the disaster are still being felt.
An explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20, 2010, resulted in the largest accidental release of oil into marine waters in history. Estimates of the size of the spill vary, but a U.S. government panel puts it at 650 million litres between the time of the explosion and when the well was finally capped 87 days later.
The CBC's Paul Hunter visited Louisiana to find out how the spill continues to affect the region.
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 5 years later
Louisiana residents say effects of massive 2010 Gulf of Mexico spill still being felt
By Paul Hunter, CBC News Posted: Apr 19, 2015 11:25 AM ET| Last Updated: Apr 19, 2015 11:25 AM ET
CBC'S Paul Hunter returns to the Gulf Coast to see how the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill is still affecting the region and its people. 10:28
Related Stories
■BP oil spill: The economic and environmental cost, 5 years later
■Bill C-22 would rewrite the rules for oil spill cleanups
■BP appeals Gulf oil spill ruling of up to $18B in damages
■'Reckless' BP gets most blame for 2010 oil spill, judge rules
■Halliburton to pay $1.1B US to settle Deepwater Horizon oil spill claims
■BP oil spill: Concerns for long-term health of workers 4 years later
Five years after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, residents and ecologists say the effects of the disaster are still being felt.
An explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20, 2010, resulted in the largest accidental release of oil into marine waters in history. Estimates of the size of the spill vary, but a U.S. government panel puts it at 650 million litres between the time of the explosion and when the well was finally capped 87 days later.
The CBC's Paul Hunter visited Louisiana to find out how the spill continues to affect the region.
S
steelmadness
Guest
Why compare oil spills like Valdez or BP to a leaky grain boat ? It is not even remotely the same thing. You prey on ignorant people, with the false front of keeping them informed. You fill this entire forum sub-topic with disinformation every day...Did I count 16 different topics in a day ? Keep us informed if you want, but share real information.
bigdogeh
Well-Known Member
I think they're trying to say that if the government can't even react or respond to a simple fuel oil spill how are we to trust our government to react or respond to a more serious oil spill. Federal disaster response teams can't even handle a small bunker oil spill in a calm, protected bay with roadside access. How could they possibly handle a spill of much heavier, chemical-laden bitumen (it doesn't float!) by a tanker in stormy weather near the Northern Gateway pipeline terminus much further north in Kitimat? Where there are no roads, steep mountains on either side, and frequent storms? and look at the damage done just by 2700 litres. thankfully most people don't comprehend information the same as yourself steelmadness. really? prey on misinformed people? Always belittle, insult and demean your enemies steelmadness. It's what makes the harperites great.
export pipelines and the oil tankers that go with them aren't the best reason to dump harper, but if your stake in Canada includes clean rivers, lakes and streams, oceans for future generations - it's a good one.
Federal disaster response teams can't even handle a small bunker oil spill in a calm, protected bay with roadside access. How could they possibly handle a spill of much heavier, chemical-laden bitumen (it doesn't float!) by a tanker in stormy weather near the Northern Gateway pipeline terminus much further north in Kitimat? Where there are no roads, steep mountains on either side, and frequent storms?
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I can see your point initially, but personally I don't get too riled up about information about the Valdez and BP being brought in. It's was going to happen. I am sure that folks that are objective enough can take what information they need and what they don't. I realize it was a grain ship and that the Port will continue to be a busy place with ships with or without tankers or pipelines; however, even though some events might be on the more extreme end of things there is always something to learn. Don't get me wrong, both the Valdez and BP were horrible and I hope they don't happen again.
Actually, Agent posts some pretty interesting things (the Elwha River for one) so I don't believe he fills this forum up with disinformation. He has his opinions like anyone else. We agree sometimes and we disagree sometimes. No biggy. I got a little ticked last week at the comments floating around one of the threads, but I have mellowed since catching some fat rainbows lately. Fishing is very therapeutic. Doing taxes not so therapeutic.
In my opinion, there has been so much information floating around about this English Bay spill in the media that is it hard to know what is true, half true or just plain false. I think some politicians that came out swinging 24 hours after the spill are finding out that they could have spoken too soon (politicians never do that) because media reports and versions of what happened changed. What is needed is a full debrief with all parties involved to examine this whole incident, fairly and rationally. Right now it's been judged in the media which is not the right way to do it. In the end, the feds, the province and municipalities are going to have work together eventually so they better start soon and all play nice because bickering and fighting about this is not good in the long run for the public - pipelines or not.
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Thank you very much bigdogeh! I kinda thought that was pretty obvious.
In addition - the long term effects of various toxic components of heavy oil products (no matter their source) are of concern to everyone who eats seafood, and the communities that depend upon harvesting that resource - and unfortunately those studies have been instituted often only after the release of a large spill that initiates a long-term study of the "fate" of those oil products in the environment - like the studies posted from the Valdez incident, or more recently - the Deepwater Horizon accident. If you go through the links I posted - there is some info on these effects, as well.
By-the-way SM - I'm not making this stuff up - just posting it. For the benefit of everyone. That is what these forums are for. Quite a bit of it is actually Science or the reporting on the Science. If you don't wish to read it - don't. Nobody is forcing you to read this forum.
If you are having such an emotional reaction to someone you don't even know posting science and information - I would stop for a minute and think about where that reaction is coming from. Is it - you are faced with questioning your blind beliefs (whatever those are) - and that scares you? And since I am the "messenger" - I become the target for your fears?
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http://www.iflscience.com/environme...il-spill-impacts-gulf-communities-and-seafood
Five Years After The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Impacts On Gulf Communities And Seafood
April 20, 2015 | by Andrew S Kane
Photo credit: Uncertainty over seafood safety caused anxiety in coastal communities in the wake of the spill. Sean Gardner/Reuters
Many people were affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that occurred five years ago today, even communities that didn’t have oil spilled directly onto their shorelines.
Hundreds of thousands of multi-generational families from Texas and Louisiana, to Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, call the Gulf Coast home. Many coastal residents are commercial, recreational and subsistence fishers, and they depend on local seafood harvests to put protein on the table for their families and neighbors. It’s the basis for their regional economy.
My involvement with the oil spill disaster came in response to concerns from coastal residents and community partners that have previously worked with our research collaborators at the University of Florida. Coastal residents were suffering job losses and mental health stress, and they voiced concerns about seafood safety.
In response to community concerns, my colleagues and I developed a research consortium, called Healthy Gulf Healthy Communities (HGHC) http://healthygulfcoast.org/ , led by Dr J Glenn Morris at the University of Florida, which was awarded support through the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, a branch of the National Institutes of Health. The team included academics with expertise in individual and family mental health, community-based social vulnerability and resiliency, and seafood safety, which is my area of research.
Outreach experts within the consortium fostered communication between the academics and the community and helped to establish a framework for working with individuals and communities in everything from data collection to tailoring communication for different audiences.
The project investigators worked with closely with coastal community members. Pictured here is the author at a Pensacola fishing tournament talking with anglers. Andy S Kane, Author provided
The goal of this community-based participatory research program was to fill critical gaps left by federal and state studies. We gathered data on potential oil spill-related human health risk in seafood, focusing on local, inshore harvests that may not have been assessed by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
We tested locally caught fish to understand the impact on public health. If there were seafood species from any locations that posed a human health risk from oil spill contaminants, people would need to know that. Alternatively, if the seafood was truly safe, as safe as NOAA and FDA claimed, people needed to know that, too.
But more importantly, people would need to believe it.
Creating A Local Picture
Rather than look at the impact of the spill on offshore fishing as NOAA did, we looked at fish, shrimp, blue crabs and oysters that were being harvested and eaten by local fishers. We processed and conducted analytical toxicology on seafood portions that we knew many Gulf residents consume: fish fillets, whole crab, whole shrimp and whole oysters. And we processed them as individuals – without pooling – so that we could see the variation between samples at different sites, and understand the range of contamination (if present) without diluting potential outliers.
The study focused on seafood harvested close to Gulf shoreline – typically less than half a mile from the shore – and includes brown and white shrimp, blue crab, Eastern oysters and species that coastal residents eat, such as Spanish mackerel. (Not to scale.) Andy S Kane, Author provided
The efforts required an integrated, transdisciplinary approach. A team of collaborating scientists supported my seafood safety efforts with expertise in aquatic pathobiology, analytical toxicology and the chemistry of hydrocarbons, food science and human nutrition, geography and GIS, biostatistics, risk assessment and community outreach.
We couldn’t assume anything. It was important to know exactly what kind of seafood folks were eating in different communities.
In order to use any potential contaminant data to develop meaningful community-specific risk assessment, we needed to integrate exposure data. Instead of relying on national statistics for seafood consumption and body weight values for Gulf Coast residents, we conducted our own surveys to discern what types of seafood people ate, how often they ate it and their typical portion sizes.
We collected seafood samples with the help of local fishers. We interacted with community members on piers and bridges bridges, from inshore small boats and from fishing tournaments. There were lots of interactions with lots of people at fishing tournaments, in American Legion lodges and community clubs, seafood festivals, science cafes and seafood worker meetings.
We learned that different communities are different. People catch, harvest and consume seafood differently based on availability, preferences and economics. Also, many Gulf coastal residents consume more seafood than national statistics might indicate. A lot more.
Stressed Communities, Safe Fish
It was interesting to do community-based science alongside social scientists, and it was disconcerting to learn community concerns from the residents who were challenged, suffering, concerned and angry about their situations after the spill. I wanted to contribute needed solutions and make a difference, even a small one, in these historically vital and vibrant communities that represent a unique way of life along the Gulf Coast.
The red-bounded areas were closed to commercial fishing as of June 7, 2010 (open now). Red star indicates the location of Macondo wellhead. The green circles show coastal regions where scientists engaged with communities to sample seafood and take consumptions surveys. NOAA, Author provided
My social science colleagues from our consortium team discovered that there was higher-than-expected mental illness, substance abuse and family strife in the aftermath of the spill. Loss of jobs and income appeared to be more important drivers for psychological stress than physical oiling of the shoreline. Thankfully, this trend appears to have leveled off recently and is showing signs of improvement.
Compensation from BP was provided to people and businesses that relied on Gulf resources affected by the spill. Parts of the compensation process were divisive for communities. For example, payment inequities within and between certain communities fueled people’s anger.
We learned that community cohesiveness and the degree of individual connectedness (how well folks are networked) had an impact on individual stress levels, anxiety and depression. It also had an effect on the degree to which the community was resilient and could come up with strategies for coping with stress.
Analytical chemistry data from more than 1,000 fish, shrimp, crab and oyster samples shows only background levels of contaminants that could possibly be related to oil. In other words, seafood appears as clean now as it was prior to the oil spill. It was reassuring that our data is not dissimilar to those produced by NOAA, the FDA and other agencies and institutions doing similar studies in other parts of the Gulf.
Timothy Valentine, CC BY-NC-SA
There remain many basic science questions to be answered regarding the chemical signature of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in seafood, and the fate of this oil in the environment. Nevertheless, the basic answer remains positive: we don’t see evidence that the oil spill has created significant seafood-related risks.
Personal Lessons
Efforts on this project have fostered reflection about my personal role as an environmental and public health scientist. Several concepts came into focus that became guiding principles for me: honesty and transparency are important in my interactions with other scientists; managers and community members made me human in the eyes of the community; and humans are easier to have meaningful interactions with than white coats in ivory towers.
The author on left working with a seafood worker sampling oysters for analysis. Andy S Kane, Author provided
It takes time to get to know people and communities – and for them to get to know you. Not everyone will agree, but all reasonable voices need to be heard. Never promise more than you can deliver. Scientists can contribute to social capital within communities.
I also now have greater clarity on our nation’s (and the world’s) dependency on energy. Although lessons learned may not fully prepare us for the next oil spill, which is likely to be different in some way, perhaps we can be more resilient as communities, and be willing to engage with our governments and industries to better ensure the safety of our precious and irreplaceable coastal resources.
The Conversation
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
Five Years After The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Impacts On Gulf Communities And Seafood
April 20, 2015 | by Andrew S Kane
Photo credit: Uncertainty over seafood safety caused anxiety in coastal communities in the wake of the spill. Sean Gardner/Reuters
Many people were affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that occurred five years ago today, even communities that didn’t have oil spilled directly onto their shorelines.
Hundreds of thousands of multi-generational families from Texas and Louisiana, to Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, call the Gulf Coast home. Many coastal residents are commercial, recreational and subsistence fishers, and they depend on local seafood harvests to put protein on the table for their families and neighbors. It’s the basis for their regional economy.
My involvement with the oil spill disaster came in response to concerns from coastal residents and community partners that have previously worked with our research collaborators at the University of Florida. Coastal residents were suffering job losses and mental health stress, and they voiced concerns about seafood safety.
In response to community concerns, my colleagues and I developed a research consortium, called Healthy Gulf Healthy Communities (HGHC) http://healthygulfcoast.org/ , led by Dr J Glenn Morris at the University of Florida, which was awarded support through the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, a branch of the National Institutes of Health. The team included academics with expertise in individual and family mental health, community-based social vulnerability and resiliency, and seafood safety, which is my area of research.
Outreach experts within the consortium fostered communication between the academics and the community and helped to establish a framework for working with individuals and communities in everything from data collection to tailoring communication for different audiences.
The project investigators worked with closely with coastal community members. Pictured here is the author at a Pensacola fishing tournament talking with anglers. Andy S Kane, Author provided
The goal of this community-based participatory research program was to fill critical gaps left by federal and state studies. We gathered data on potential oil spill-related human health risk in seafood, focusing on local, inshore harvests that may not have been assessed by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
We tested locally caught fish to understand the impact on public health. If there were seafood species from any locations that posed a human health risk from oil spill contaminants, people would need to know that. Alternatively, if the seafood was truly safe, as safe as NOAA and FDA claimed, people needed to know that, too.
But more importantly, people would need to believe it.
Creating A Local Picture
Rather than look at the impact of the spill on offshore fishing as NOAA did, we looked at fish, shrimp, blue crabs and oysters that were being harvested and eaten by local fishers. We processed and conducted analytical toxicology on seafood portions that we knew many Gulf residents consume: fish fillets, whole crab, whole shrimp and whole oysters. And we processed them as individuals – without pooling – so that we could see the variation between samples at different sites, and understand the range of contamination (if present) without diluting potential outliers.
The study focused on seafood harvested close to Gulf shoreline – typically less than half a mile from the shore – and includes brown and white shrimp, blue crab, Eastern oysters and species that coastal residents eat, such as Spanish mackerel. (Not to scale.) Andy S Kane, Author provided
The efforts required an integrated, transdisciplinary approach. A team of collaborating scientists supported my seafood safety efforts with expertise in aquatic pathobiology, analytical toxicology and the chemistry of hydrocarbons, food science and human nutrition, geography and GIS, biostatistics, risk assessment and community outreach.
We couldn’t assume anything. It was important to know exactly what kind of seafood folks were eating in different communities.
In order to use any potential contaminant data to develop meaningful community-specific risk assessment, we needed to integrate exposure data. Instead of relying on national statistics for seafood consumption and body weight values for Gulf Coast residents, we conducted our own surveys to discern what types of seafood people ate, how often they ate it and their typical portion sizes.
We collected seafood samples with the help of local fishers. We interacted with community members on piers and bridges bridges, from inshore small boats and from fishing tournaments. There were lots of interactions with lots of people at fishing tournaments, in American Legion lodges and community clubs, seafood festivals, science cafes and seafood worker meetings.
We learned that different communities are different. People catch, harvest and consume seafood differently based on availability, preferences and economics. Also, many Gulf coastal residents consume more seafood than national statistics might indicate. A lot more.
Stressed Communities, Safe Fish
It was interesting to do community-based science alongside social scientists, and it was disconcerting to learn community concerns from the residents who were challenged, suffering, concerned and angry about their situations after the spill. I wanted to contribute needed solutions and make a difference, even a small one, in these historically vital and vibrant communities that represent a unique way of life along the Gulf Coast.
The red-bounded areas were closed to commercial fishing as of June 7, 2010 (open now). Red star indicates the location of Macondo wellhead. The green circles show coastal regions where scientists engaged with communities to sample seafood and take consumptions surveys. NOAA, Author provided
My social science colleagues from our consortium team discovered that there was higher-than-expected mental illness, substance abuse and family strife in the aftermath of the spill. Loss of jobs and income appeared to be more important drivers for psychological stress than physical oiling of the shoreline. Thankfully, this trend appears to have leveled off recently and is showing signs of improvement.
Compensation from BP was provided to people and businesses that relied on Gulf resources affected by the spill. Parts of the compensation process were divisive for communities. For example, payment inequities within and between certain communities fueled people’s anger.
We learned that community cohesiveness and the degree of individual connectedness (how well folks are networked) had an impact on individual stress levels, anxiety and depression. It also had an effect on the degree to which the community was resilient and could come up with strategies for coping with stress.
Analytical chemistry data from more than 1,000 fish, shrimp, crab and oyster samples shows only background levels of contaminants that could possibly be related to oil. In other words, seafood appears as clean now as it was prior to the oil spill. It was reassuring that our data is not dissimilar to those produced by NOAA, the FDA and other agencies and institutions doing similar studies in other parts of the Gulf.
Timothy Valentine, CC BY-NC-SA
There remain many basic science questions to be answered regarding the chemical signature of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in seafood, and the fate of this oil in the environment. Nevertheless, the basic answer remains positive: we don’t see evidence that the oil spill has created significant seafood-related risks.
Personal Lessons
Efforts on this project have fostered reflection about my personal role as an environmental and public health scientist. Several concepts came into focus that became guiding principles for me: honesty and transparency are important in my interactions with other scientists; managers and community members made me human in the eyes of the community; and humans are easier to have meaningful interactions with than white coats in ivory towers.
The author on left working with a seafood worker sampling oysters for analysis. Andy S Kane, Author provided
It takes time to get to know people and communities – and for them to get to know you. Not everyone will agree, but all reasonable voices need to be heard. Never promise more than you can deliver. Scientists can contribute to social capital within communities.
I also now have greater clarity on our nation’s (and the world’s) dependency on energy. Although lessons learned may not fully prepare us for the next oil spill, which is likely to be different in some way, perhaps we can be more resilient as communities, and be willing to engage with our governments and industries to better ensure the safety of our precious and irreplaceable coastal resources.
The Conversation
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
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